Mad Meerkat Finance (not to be confused with normal Meerkat Finance) is in the hole, to the tune of $2M.
The Cronos-based DEX had its front-end exploited, resulting in losses of over $2M for its users.
Beginning around 7:30 PM on 4th of May, users swapping, adding or removing liquidity on the protocol had the output funds redirected straight into the attacker’s wallet.
The exploit lasted for approximately 3 hours before the team took down the front-end.
During the attack, team members in Discord advised users not to interact with the site.
But why was the compromised site left up for so long? Why didn’t they block access?
It is unclear exactly how the attacker managed to gain access, and the official post mortem doesn’t give much away:
MM.finance site was the subject of a DNS attack earlier where an attacker managed to inject a malicious contract address into the frontend code. Attacker used a DNS vulnerability to modify the router contract address in our hosted files.
This led to some speculation in the rekt.news telegram group, with users contemplating whether the exploit had redirected users to a cloned version of the page.
“hmm - looks like it was actually a dns redirect possibly…” “people are saying bad SSL certificate”
While others were more skeptical.
Some users raised their concerns via Discord, but were not taken seriously by the team.
Whatever the attack vector, the exploit was prepared, exposing users’ transactions to a malicious router linked to the attacker’s address.
The post-mortem advises users to double check for the correct router address (0x145677FC4d9b8F19B5D56d1820c48e0443049a30) during transaction confirmations.
Another mongoose playing fast and loose with their operational security.
The Mad Meerkat team have traced the attacker’s financing back to OKX, and are appealing for help in determining the hacker’s identity.
The affected users will be reimbursed via the team’s share of trading fees. Further details on the compensation package can be found here.
This will be the first exploit on Cronos to go onto our leaderboard, with a lowly entry of #76.
Front-end attacks, back-end attacks, when will we reach the end of the attacks?
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