The Vanishing Act
Abracadabra has finally put a price on its dollar: Four cents.
A magician's trick has three acts: The pledge, the turn and the prestige, when whatever vanishes comes back.
Abracadabra's is missing the third. What the wind-down proposes returning to MIM holders is not the dollar they were promised, but a fraction of it.
One of them had received 1.6 billion SPELL from the treasury about fourteen months earlier.
Treasury to Voter 1: 0x50d78c15b65c885093a5486b735e06570af3b5715391826ed8816adc990080f6
Starting a week after that vote closed, the Depeg Contingency Fund (DCF), a 6 billion SPELL reserve built to defend MIM in a crisis, saw its entire SPELL endowment move out in two large transfers, on June 11 and June 17.
DCF to forwarder, June 11 (1,500,000,000 SPELL): 0xb536e74122c82d5b19cf0b0176ebfb6156fa3cd0ac4e26de773835526cb654c2
DCF to forwarder, June 17 (4,499,999,980 SPELL): 0xfb009066d191a0479943bc5a2840ace9dfed77a34cbc8b2015355f7f68a718d5
By the end of June, MIM was trading at about 16 cents on Ethereum DEXs.
On June 25, the treasury executed three SPELL mints - 3 billion, 3 billion and 2 billion - totaling 8 billion tokens.
It then routed roughly 2.67 billion SPELL toward each of three destinations: Bybit-attributed and Gate-attributed deposit addresses, and an intermediary that forwarded SPELL to a MEXC-attributed address.
By September, the wind-down's author held voting power that traced in part to treasury-provided assets.
His first wind-down proposal failed to reach quorum, the minimum required voting participation.
On the revised proposal, the treasury’s own multisig wallet supplied about 75% of the recorded voting power in favor, according to the October 14 capture.
That proposal counts about $900,000 in actionable backing against roughly $22 million of MIM outside protocol addresses.
It does not reconcile the SPELL transferred out of the peg fund, the minted SPELL, or the ETH and stablecoins that left treasury Safes in July.
The proposal attributes roughly $21 million in bad debt to a series of exploits, but no published accounting connects the assets that moved from June onward to that hole.
If the treasury helps fund the voter, supplies the dominant recorded ballot and proposes the recovery price, whose wind-down is this?
Every trick starts with something the audience trusts.
For Abracadabra, that was a dollar.
MIM launched in May 2021 as a stablecoin minted against interest-bearing collateral locked in lending markets the protocol calls Cauldrons.
Maintaining the peg depended on adequate collateral backing and deep trading liquidity, particularly on Curve.
By January 2022, deposits had peaked above $6.3 billion.
The peg had wobbled before. In June 2022, as Terra's UST collapse spread through DeFi, MIM slipped to about 93 cents amid allegations of $12 million in Terra-related bad debt.
Founder Daniele Sestagalli disputed claims of insolvency, saying the treasury held enough assets to cover the debt.
In February 2024, the DAO built a backstop.
AIP 44 created the Depeg Contingency Fund, a strategic reserve meant to step in and shore up MIM's peg and collateralization under extreme stress.
AIP 44 set its seed capital at 6 billion SPELL, the DAO's own governance token, to be held in a dedicated Safe.
Depeg Contingency Fund Safe: 0xC1C2F3eE323Ce42478c1c77BfCe09eAA5E7F72C2
The backstop was created after the first of three major exploits.
January 2024 cost $6.5 million through a rounding error in cauldron logic.
March 2025 drained $13 million from GMX-linked cauldrons on Arbitrum.
October 2025 took $1.8 million, when deprecated CauldronV4 contracts let an attacker skip the solvency check and borrow 1,793,755 MIM against nothing.
After the third hit, the DAO treasury did what a peg defender was supposed to do: It bought the dumped MIM back on the open market
Buyback transaction: 0xbaede1ddbab71fb48d25139e720356d8c487d47ce4b94aaf683969dc1fb1c984
The team said the purchase had "completely reversed the effect of the attack."
After the third exploit, the pledge still held in one sense: Abracadabra said its treasury had paid to defend MIM.
Eight months later, MIM would face another peg crisis, the kind the dedicated reserve existed to backstop.
When the peg finally cracked, who was holding the keys to the fund built for that exact moment?
The Turn
The second act is where the object leaves the stage.
In early June 2026, 0xmerlin.eth put a "strategic transition and stewardship" proposal on Snapshot.
Proposal author (0xmerlin.eth):
0xfddfE525054efaAD204600d00CA86ADb1Cc2ea8a
The pitch promised to revitalize Abracadabra as a leading DeFi protocol, restore growth, strengthen governance and chart a long-term future for SPELL.
It also came with a cast list: The proposal would leave the DAO as the governing body while handing operational stewardship - including development, treasury deployment and day-to-day management, to Anubis.
It named Greg Dewitt on operations, Paul Parker and Glenn Kennedy as directors, and Jack Niewold as the expected project lead. Alapin Holdings was listed as a strategic partner, the incoming group was described as supported by dao5, and dao5 founder Tekin Salimi was named as an adviser.
Two wallets voted. Both backed the transition, together supplying enough voting power to clear the proposal’s quorum.
Voter 1:
0x93652aE25d0ba757c3C92A4Deb0b05dd1D4efE35
Voter 2:
0x350D87f94dC92EE81F896271500195E5B8E3680B
Together they cast about 5.5 billion SPELL, enough to clear the space's 3 billion quorum, though neither could have done it alone. The vote closed June 3rd.
Voter 1 was no stranger to the treasury.
On April 1, 2025, about fourteen months before the vote, the treasury sent that wallet exactly 1,600,000,000 SPELL.
Treasury to Voter 1:
0x50d78c15b65c885093a5486b735e06570af3b5715391826ed8816adc990080f6
In March 2023, the shared Safe became a 2-of-2 wallet owned by the treasury and Voter 1.
Shared Safe:
0x559AED2EFD263d038D5D5c8695A0883680139695
Treasury and Voter 1 added as owners:
0x17d4d72a12eccb4357cfdfd3e67e479a2394894716e2cdcc6a44018983acbfef
Prior owner removed, threshold set to 2:
0xac96d09400227a2af0f5f2c3e5c4cb75751697f4f2d0989ddffd4f3338d58556
The treasury had funded one of the wallets that voted for the handover, and shared a Safe with it. What was the relationship behind those connections?
The changes began almost immediately. On June 4, four addresses received ETH from a Kraken-labeled hot wallet. All four would be added to the Depeg Contingency Fund’s owner set the following day.
Kraken-labeled wallet to 0xfD694815E4038A03145B408553A5b06efd13D5F1: 0xd1a417b0fda898951ff9051df425b2c19f1520a595fe8962be4e0aeca1d9c90c
Kraken-labeled wallet to 0x557c58E7b76022FD99BE8F4688383963135972fb:
0x4872a73300286f6046c302bafbd9ba222fc88ed010fb9b333574b1e5f5254c67
Kraken-labeled wallet to 0xBF79E8CA5719C24AB606B9cB3Fa85C3c5fF339BB:
0xd61f812b259ef06bb2f4d164041a5f0fbb7e80e37270ae7964c618ad9cd00e7b
Kraken-labeled wallet to 0xA765C72712F0DeBFa0fd16564940f7A2c9E0eae1:
0x8d54ce6a897b36a18c90b98727520bd2b2746e1323ff9045ffd75396270e1047
On June 5, a single transaction changed the fund’s owner set: Three of those addresses replaced existing owners, while the fourth was added outright. The changes altered control of the 6 billion SPELL reserve six days before the first large transfer.
Depeg Contingency Fund owner change:
0x6b0b415fc341b0fd7d1431bf7dfda87238b9a8d8bea2378d9439e751f4a17a67
On June 8, two transactions were submitted to the fund’s Safe for approval: A test payment at 15:23:30 UTC and a 1.5 billion SPELL transfer at 15:25:54 UTC.
About an hour later, the treasury sold 200,000 MIM.
Treasury MIM sale:
0x98fac1d40697ff385d90c96eff90af401c372380babe9cc494651e55f2396101
Then the reserve moved.
Trading Strategy co-founder Mikko Ohtamaa later counted treasury MIM sales on June 8 and 11 that netted roughly $0.5 million while the peg was already slipping.
June 11, 16:41 UTC: 1,500,000,000 SPELL left the fund for a forwarder, which passed it a minute later to a BitGo custody address.
Fund to forwarder:
0xb536e74122c82d5b19cf0b0176ebfb6156fa3cd0ac4e26de773835526cb654c2
Forwarder address:
0xDf09981A7D6F2D1f17211889B529C08C03b12e40
Forwarder to BitGo:
0x991057cd1031627af7ba2316623002dbf5717eaf3132aad56edab4c3119b541b
BitGo custody address:
0xbd02c51150a4ab6ce97b9de2025644594f3e75b8
June 17, 16:30 UTC: The remaining 4,499,999,980 SPELL followed through a second forwarder to the same BitGo address.
Fund to forwarder:
0xfb009066d191a0479943bc5a2840ace9dfed77a34cbc8b2015355f7f68a718d5
Forwarder address:
0xDf456c20161F115D715D94ac38497177F5044afE
Forwarder to BitGo:
0xe6b8a2c1711b934b208188b4879006ea7fd7982809b1d8e039ec20ee226085a2
BitGo custody address:
0xbd02c51150a4Ab6Ce97B9de2025644594F3E75B8
Six days, two large transfers. Together with the two 10-SPELL test payments, they exhausted the fund’s 6 billion SPELL endowment.
The “BitGo 1” label identifies custody infrastructure, not the customer or beneficial owner. The transfers establish that the reserve left the fund and reached that address; they do not, by themselves, establish who instructed the movements or how the assets were subsequently used.
On the public channels, the same weeks sounded very different.
On June 14, the team said it had funded a new Curve pool with $100,000 in MIM, USDT and USDC following “unexpected liquidity withdrawals” linked to changes in DeFi incentive strategies. It called improving MIM liquidity its “highest operational priority,” adding: “we’re backing it with our balance sheet.”
By June 17, the peg fund’s entire 6 billion SPELL endowment had moved out.
On June 18, it said it had deployed 70 million SPELL to incentivize the MIM-2Pool on Curve, describing the move as part of its effort to rebuild liquidity and increase market depth.
On June 24, Abracadabra announced emergency measures, including gradually increasing borrowing rates and temporarily stopping direct incentives and Curve bribes until MIM returned to peg.
Then early the following day, the Abracadabra treasury minted 8 billion fresh SPELL in three transactions.
Abracadabra Treasury:
0xDF2C270f610Dc35d8fFDA5B453E74db5471E126B
Mint, 3 billion SPELL:
0x47eaeffe7b61c71d8133030f91f46cefd3b80a91dbdfbd526f617cebd51e60e7
Mint, 3 billion SPELL:
0x468aad102e2cf23511b749bb2d90f98fd18576460ef5ae31486df5324b40f1e5
Mint, 2 billion SPELL:
0xe5e7aea7c9484690f2d2349374051ee4c8e540fb3f5803326774e0c6a85b950d
Roughly 2.67 billion went to each of three destinations: A Bybit-attributed deposit, a Gate-attributed deposit and an intermediary feeding MEXC.
To Bybit-attributed deposit (0x9390021c7Ef8a20E966ee5aA53f87Df8B286A386):
0x6a216ee8bb41e55464e4f10a44f2692f0c458f2fbe5661db7ccf3b74fc72cfc5
To Gate-attributed deposit (0x769E4e225DA686986D8ddc8BcD4fa8d3Bf046A60):
0x9878705039b60c4e25653c7295a896ad45a7f6785bd559dc0d545b1c80748182
To intermediary (0x53F39C473a1574399d39dE5f912e4BB16732ef89):
0xf66a8b2007d0918bd02c3f88491f0d5194e9f65377e5bb62a479738290a92c21
Intermediary to MEXC 3 (0x3cc936b795a188f0e246cbb2d74c5bd190aecf18):
0xab3092a02c0538070c42f9e66e1c8f0e7f2720c17a29a86996743eda49b46c6d
On July 5, Abracadabra mentioned an action plan to restore the peg, with a roadmap "coming this week."
They have not posted since, they simply ghosted, at least from Twitter.
The vanishing act was only in the updates, not in the transactions.
Nine days later, the treasury Safes moved again.
About 2,142 ETH and WETH went from the Arbitrum and Ethereum treasuries to a Binance-attributed deposit address.
Binance-attributed deposit address:
0x1b20b200a78c6068ce5ea96226d1b53e0a119202
Arbitrum, 1,731 ETH:
0xda3eb8b67d6863647e756331b7a843051b1dcd4afe7db61bc6393af2d55e657c
Ethereum, 366.677 ETH:
0x45b0bbffeeae3f54a4de8bf6d786ba68c87b60abb856930d4f88c025ad7ed976
Ethereum, 44.665 WETH:
0x089387036aeb42f4abc8795ac694cfa61d7ef635f5827f38fab7ade106fee630
On July 14th, another 3,793,188.187079 USDC left the Arbitrum treasury in four payments through two intermediaries. The second intermediary made three onward payments to a Coinbase-attributed deposit address.
Its balances were mixed: The downstream deposits cannot be treated as an exact accounting of the treasury’s USDC.
First intermediary address:
0x0E533b4eeDD5bb6049b9C2203a4eeAA3d9e39079
Second intermediary address:
0xdb16610262EaF78871B0f912d8FB725fd10a6b64
Coinbase-attributed deposit address:
0x7907815069e96001e22954b9d55cd000b35dbca5
Arbitrum treasury to first intermediary, 10 USDC:
0xd8684ff4858e535b7883a3c1d6ec63ab77e30a471734ccf255afa4c8a18e5847
First intermediary to second intermediary, 10 USDC:
0x2b17ec340121168c85207f0d8d0a54c817f7cd6d91a43bdb50f9271908ed3b94
Arbitrum treasury to first intermediary, 2,848,011.002688 USDC:
0x11fc099e0cb20cd6ace834a1a9f6dac3a53da6286a47b7560c9723b168e040b7
First intermediary to second intermediary, 2,848,011.002688 USDC:
0x1eedf85277a58793f3a4a78f29f12713c6f77168a7a39f395bddab2e82bbe7a6
Second intermediary to Coinbase-attributed deposit, 2,861,118.32 USDC:
0xcee9a131aaffacad6ad1f1c6152e88bf271215c875afbfe4ff45650281e937c2
Coinbase-attributed deposit to onward recipient, 2,861,118.32 USDC:
0x07adf7858f5c3baf1d00a5448940eecad55ed02234ff36af79070b93c2fe005f
Arbitrum treasury to first intermediary, 64,929.029202 USDC:
0x216c91ebda70cf71c4c72cd4f40f280b4779c475bffe1a3033499bb9c67ed858
First intermediary to second intermediary, 64,929.029202 USDC:
0x3d4916f8a7a33cfb26cce0b1f883dd736a4ff9bc2d3695bdecbc31ac3ddc2df8
Second intermediary to Coinbase-attributed deposit, 59,929.03 USDC:
0x850204682a4d99e4aa08045832de7f8ff34344869fe1a40e089f7d6e13be6efd
Coinbase-attributed deposit to onward recipient, 59,929.03 USDC:
0xe166b21f65924b3a0243d64fc16b49e047cfad10c28c37814543255f75ae6b2d
Arbitrum treasury to first intermediary, 880,238.155189 USDC:
0x9efc75822f6096ff361875bbb82259b8decd906c8c76fc75f29fb6d758c36d0c
First intermediary to second intermediary, 880,238.155189 USDC:
0x775994d9d96e6e453709967fff002c3756842a532c847850b14732cff2d97db0
Second intermediary to Coinbase-attributed deposit, 880,000 USDC:
0xd371c428a9b8349cf0a8fe633a710707474ecfcf8564e34b0c610305fe8500e7
Coinbase-attributed deposit to Coinbase 85, 880,000 USDC:
0x9b81cde7b04d3475b7850d3db93fd9fdae289ffebe549752cdb1587085eebd4d
Coinbase 85 address:
0xd55c1ae0e52918c864616dd5ffba6c50b8fbe39e
Separately, the Avalanche treasury sent 82,047.752950 USDt to a Binance-attributed deposit address. Less than seven minutes later, that address forwarded the same amount to an address publicly labeled “Binance Hot Wallet 10.”
Binance-attributed deposit address:
0x1b20b200a78c6068ce5ea96226d1b53e0a119202
Avalanche treasury to Binance-attributed deposit, 82,047.752950 USDt:
0x80382a8d35dc96dc45bf5a6a2fa722e74e02d2e10361a8fed4d5d884b9f6c01f
Binance-attributed deposit to Binance Hot Wallet 10, 82,047.752950 USDt:
0x8046574f029b717d06ec054eaac05a5a25cf2e4c30ceae9c695852ce107cb27d
Binance Hot Wallet 10 address:
0x9f8c163cba728e99993abe7495f06c0a3c8ac8b9
A further 504,253.194709 USDT left the Ethereum treasury through a separate intermediary route. After mixing with other balances, the route culminated in a 509,000 USDT payment to an unidentified EIP-7702 account.
Ethereum treasury to first intermediary, 504,253.194709 USDT:
0x290ecc4b8f51acce6fcd1b3e83432e4ad4766f287d6c00856c98fa6696f57703
First intermediary to second intermediary, 504,253.194709 USDT:
0x54569c1ff9e6d3b5bd0e4691fc4a062194ca3239b6c58f1e4b23c739cf6a43f7
Second intermediary to third intermediary, 509,000 USDT:
0xddb909d8e4bb4d4e761283812c47e1b287cc2fe7ae1933a82315cdb117749975
Third intermediary address:
0xa2cf88762c80c65cad9f51f8e245282d6d329913
Third intermediary to unidentified EIP-7702 account, 509,000 USDT:
0x30e9cdf7020193d6a4ff6346ae56114c6260d339ea5a02e720493b976918461b
Unidentified EIP-7702 recipient address:
0x755bc7104b98EA061197bE76D1E49fA84e3E702f
Pharos flagged the movements the next day, estimating approximately $8.3 million in treasury assets and saying there had been no public explanation.
Its roughly 2,142 ETH/WETH estimate matches the source amounts listed in the section above.
The promised recovery roadmap had not appeared. About eleven weeks after the July transfers, a wind-down proposal did.
Who would supply the votes?
The Prestige
The third act is where the object comes back.
For MIM holders, it came back as an estimate.
The road to that number began with the wallet that would author the wind-down proposal.
Wind-down proposal author:
0xE843FaEa0E6100900e591E89Be04b07285A59A58
On September 24, the treasury sent approximately 2.906 steCRV to that wallet.
Treasury to Wind-down proposal author:
0x389ebd4ecb8b7094bf7a0f32429fa0b45ca3a46f27ad99f077861b852e2bc77a
Three days later, the treasury sold 900,000 MIM for 4,138.817068 USDC, about half a cent per token.
Treasury MIM sale (September 27):
0x4452d575722824beb6408169ccb3278c6424e925355b63e39b3445248d5b79b6
The next morning, 4,138.817168 USDC and 1.314494852 ETH moved from the treasury to the Wind-down proposal author.
Treasury to Wind-down proposal author (September 28):
0x38662b49f0e72dfce6f8764f20a39edb8c973fe6ad7d3cf40496c011625450a3
Within six minutes of receiving the treasury payment, the Wind-down proposal author had bought approximately 40,547,420.511 SPELL with that USDC and another 59,500,000 SPELL with 2.316733561 WETH. That evening, the wallet staked approximately 100,047,420.511 SPELL.
Wind-down proposal author buys 40,547,420.511 SPELL with USDC:
0x9bbcf0ba9c5e383f08298f1f16bca43ff461a0d7fadf8d832bf5f1a0682518a1
Wind-down proposal author buys 59,500,000 SPELL with WETH:
0x94e41c4143af2b1c25845de96cfe063733cd95abd84df7f59c6f6db5464e0601
Wind-down proposal author stakes 100,047,420.511 SPELL:
0x451620ee542789767a62b098358bc810de80f8352ae3ee11977f170aa11ed6e1
About seven hours later, the wind-down proposal went live.
The Wind-down proposal author’s wallet then voted for it with approximately 100 million SPELL.
The pitch was blunt. The proposal described MIM as a protocol liability senior to SPELL and said SPELL retained no accounting value until that liability was fully serviced.
The team said what it found was "far worse than initially expected."
According to the proposal, the total collateral backing MIM debt is about $1.2 million.
Roughly $300,000 sat in an immutable Arbitrum WETH cauldron whose interest rate can't be changed.
That left about $900,000 the team considered actionable, against nearly $22 million in MIM held outside protocol addresses.
Under the proposed plan, eligible collateral would be recovered, converted to WETH and distributed through a Merkl contract.
Borrowers would receive their collateral value minus debt calculated at $1 per MIM. MIM holders would share the remainder, estimated at about four cents per MIM.
The proposed four-cent distribution was about 8.7 times the treasury’s implied September 27 sale price of roughly 0.46 cents per MIM, calculated from its exchange of 900,000 MIM for 4,138.817068 USDC, valuing USDC at $1.
One other wallet voted against, with approximately 523,446 in SPELL voting power.
The vote closed September 30 with two ballots totaling approximately 100.57 million in voting power, about 3.35% of the space's 3 billion quorum.
The revised proposal expanded voting eligibility and introduced a proposal-specific quorum.
The additional voter was Abracadabra's treasury Safe. In an October 14 capture, one day before voting closed, its 296,115,860.84 SPELL voting power accounted for approximately 74.75% of the 396,163,281.35 voting power cast in favor.
The new threshold lived in the text. The proposal announced a threshold of more than 309,046,858.1 votes, framed as 30% of an "available" SPELL voting supply of 1,030,156,193.663.
Snapshot itself still demanded 3 billion. At capture, the vote had reached 13.2% of it.
The proposal says the setting can't be changed, because the former administrators are unreachable.
Without the treasury’s ballot, the wind-down proposal falls short of the threshold its own author set.
The treasury supplied assets that helped fund the author's voting power, then supplied most of the captured support for the revised wind-down. That proposal put the estimated recovery at about four cents per MIM.
The proposal’s four-cent estimate was not a guaranteed payment. Nor did clearing the threshold settle the question of independence: Who authorized the treasury’s role in helping fund the author’s voting power and supplying the support needed to clear that threshold at the October 14 capture?
A magician never reveals the method.
But when a treasury helps fund the author’s voting power and supplies the decisive support, shouldn’t the method be part of the record?
The Method
Every trick has one. Here, the transfers are visible. The accounting that connects them is not.
Much of the evidence assembled here began with a dossier compiled by an affected Curve MIM liquidity provider and shared with Rekt News.
His framing is a claimant’s, and he has money in the outcome. The transaction records he cites can be checked independently; those discussed here are linked throughout. But tracing an asset’s destination does not, by itself, establish its purpose.
The missing piece is a reconciliation: 6 billion SPELL left the peg fund, 8 billion freshly minted SPELL went toward exchanges, and roughly 2,142 ETH and WETH and 4.38 million in stablecoins left treasury Safes.
Those movements remain unreconciled with the $900,000 the wind-down describes as actionable collateral. The outflows alone do not establish that more assets remain available for recovery. What remains unexplained is how the assets were used, what remained, and how the proposal arrived at its figure.
AIP 44 was intended to set the rules for the reserve. According to the dossier, a review of 97 proposals found no subsequent vote authorizing deployment of the fund. That finding is limited to the archive examined; it does not establish that no authorization existed elsewhere.
The signer record raises a narrower question. The fund's Safe records list the address associated with 0xmerlin.eth, identified here as the June handover proposal's author, among the five confirmers of the 1.5 billion SPELL tranche.
The roughly 4.5 billion SPELL that followed was confirmed by the same four newly added owner addresses, plus an original owner whose identity remains unverified.
Who controlled those wallets at the time, and under whose authority did they approve the transfers?
The June proposal named directors, operators and partners. Naming them does not establish who controlled the signing wallets or authorized the transfers.
Then there are the holders whose route to recovery remains unclear.
Liquidity providers in Curve's MIM/3Crv pool receive its pool token, MIM-3LP3CRV-f, representing their position rather than a direct MIM balance. The pool pairs MIM with 3Crv, the LP token for Curve’s DAI, USDC and USDT pool.
Yearn adds another layer: Its now-retired Curve MIM vault was designed to accept that pool token and deploy it through yield strategies, with depositors receiving vault shares rather than MIM.
Neither the original nor the refined proposal explicitly explains how those indirect holdings would be treated in a distribution.
The remaining questions concern instructions, authority and accounting: What were the outgoing signers told before approving the June 5 owner change? What governance authority supported each deployment from the Depeg Contingency Fund? What were the 8 billion newly minted SPELL intended to fund, and how were any proceeds used? Which customers or beneficiaries were credited through the July exchange routes? What accounting connects those movements to the $900,000 estimate? Which owners approved the treasury’s ballot, and who holds the Snapshot space’s administrative keys?
A transaction hash can show that assets moved. It cannot, on its own, explain the decision behind the movement.
If holders are being asked to accept the wind-down's numbers, shouldn't they also receive the accounting that makes those numbers add up?
The audience is still in its seats, waiting for the third act.
The pledge was simple: One MIM equals one dollar.
A 6 billion SPELL contingency fund was later established to help defend the peg.
The turn came over a single summer: A handover approved by two wallets, new keys on the reserve, roughly six billion SPELL transferred out between June 11 and June 17, eight billion more minted, and a single day in July that moved ETH and stablecoins out of treasury Safes.
Every one of those moves left a receipt. The records assembled for this investigation do not include an accounting that connects them.
The proposed prestige was a wind-down: About $900,000 in actionable collateral and an estimated recovery of four cents per MIM. The treasury helped fund the author’s voting power. Its own Safe supplied most of the recorded support at the October 14 capture.
Under the proposal, eligible MIM holders would share the remainder, after the treasury had already sold 900,000 MIM for approximately 0.46 cents each, valuing USDC at $1.
The proposal attributes the bad debt to a series of exploits. That explanation does not, by itself, reconcile the reserve transfers.
The chain records the movements. A reconciliation must explain their purpose, any proceeds and what remains.
When the transfers are public but the accounting is missing, what has transparency actually bought the people still holding MIM?
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